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Question 
▪ What evidence is there that middle-income countries need to invest more than they 
currently do in climate change adaptation? 
▪ What are the main likely human and economic costs if middle-income countries fail to do 
so considering how poor and vulnerable groups are affected? 
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1. Summary  
While potential costs and tracked spending on adaptation to climate change in middle-
income countries (MICs) are difficult to measure, there is wide agreement that current 
spending on adaption is highly inadequate (Buchner et al, 2019; PCC, 2018; UNEP, 2016; 
Yeo, 2019). Climate finance has been increasing, both from domestic sources and through 
international transfers, but spending on climate change mitigation through renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and sustainable transport makes up the vast majority of investments (Buchner 
et al., 2019; Yeo, 2019). Given that MICs are predicted to be among the most vulnerable to 
future climate shocks and also to high poverty rates (Shepherd et al, 2013), it will be critical to fill 
this financing gap in order to address these vulnerabilities. There is great interest in leveraging 
public finance to increase private sector investments in adaptation in MICs but, so far, private 
investment in adaptation investment has been minimal (Buchner et al, 2019; Yeo, 2019).  
This report begins with a summary of available estimates of climate adaption finance needs and 
tracked spending in MICs. Due to data and standardisation limitations, it is not possible to 
accurately measure total costs for adaptation in MICs, therefore this report goes on to briefly 
explore some of the potential human and economic costs of failing to invest. Evidence limitations 
also means that it is not possible to determine the most effective adaptation finance modalities 
for MICs, therefore this report concludes with a short overview of cross-cutting themes that are 
widely discussed in the literature with some support from empirical evidence.  
Overall, evidence on the costs of adaptation and tracked spending across possible 
sources of funding is minimal. This is a well-known challenge, with ongoing debate as to how 
to resolve the issue going forwards. Initiatives to address evidence gaps on finance for 
adaptation include the OECD’s tracking of climate finance flows under the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) and The Climate Policy Initiative’s regular Global ‘Landscape of 
Climate Finance’ Report. Empirical evidence is particularly lacking on the effectiveness of 
different finance modalities for adaptation. No comprehensive studies were identified for this 
report, only early summary evidence of ongoing climate funds such as the Adaptation Fund 
established under the Kyoto Protocol (see: Manuamorn et al., 2020). 
Despite these limitations, three cross-cutting themes have been identified that are either 
partly supported by empirical evidence or are widely supported by leading institutions or 
climate finance experts. These are: 
▪ International public finance for adaptation through bilateral or multilateral institutions is 
more effective when accompanied by complimentary non-financial support such as 
research, training and supportive trade policy.  
▪ Although many look to the private sector as being key to filling the adaptation finance 
gap, so far very little private finance has been mobilised for climate adaptation. It may be 
that the profit motives of the private sector are incompatible with adaptation’s focus on 
cost savings.  
▪ There is emerging evidence that decentralised spending to support local adaptation 
programming can provide good value for money. Empowering local communities to 
engage directly in climate adaptation programming is considered to be an effective way 
to address specific adaptation needs and to ensure the inclusion of marginalised groups 
who are disproportionately impacted by climate change. 
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2. Estimated costs of climate finance in MICs 
Estimating Total Costs 
The estimated total costs of adaptation in low- and middle income countries (LICs and 
MICs) range between USD 140 billion to USD 300 billion by 2030, and between USD 280 
billion and USD 500 billion by 2050 (UNEP, 2016, p.xii). No systematic country-level estimates 
are available to distinguish climate adaptation costs between MICs and LICs. One estimate that 
allows disaggregation by region comes from a 2010 World Bank synthesis report drawing on 
national databases and sub-national data. Of the USD 70-100 billion per year that the report 
estimates will be required globally to adapt to a global temperature change of 2°C, costs are 
predicted to be highest in East Asia and the Pacific (USD 25.7 billion), followed by Latin America 
and the Caribbean (USD 21.3 billion) and sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (both estimated at 
USD  17.1 billion) (World Bank, 2010, p.xix1).  
The wide variability in global and regional estimated costs of climate adaptation is due to 
a number of data and standardisation limitations (IPCC, 2018; Micale et al., 2018; UNEP, 
2016; UNFCC, 2007). Some of the difficulties in estimating accurate costs for climate adaptation 
include: 
• The use of different projected global temperature changes to estimate the impacts of 
climate change; 
• The inclusion of different human and economic impacts to estimate costs; 
• Different assumptions about the relationship between climate change and human and 
economic outcomes and about countries’ adaptive capacities to manage them; 
• Different assumptions about the economic value of these outcomes;  
• Whether estimates should include the compounding effect of failing to address current 
climate adaptation needs. 
A lack of clarity on the complex relationship between climate change and human, and 
economic outcomes appears to be the leading challenge for estimating the costs of 
adaptation. The range of possible impacts is vast, with different priorities, assumptions and 
availability of data leading to different calculations of adaptation costs.  
“Studies with greater coverage will produce higher estimates, as they include a larger 
number of impacts. Comprehensive studies at the national level… identify several hundred 
potential risks and opportunities from climate change. Nonetheless, most quantitative studies 
focus on a subset of the most important of these, mainly due to the complexity associated 
with quantifying and monetising impacts.” 
               (UNEP, 2016, p.14) 
Few estimates offer disaggregated costs by sector, however adaptation costs for 
infrastructure, particularly in urban areas, are expected to pose some of the highest costs 
for adaptation (World Bank, 2010). Infrastructure that may be impacted includes: public 
 
1 These estimates reflect gross costs (not including gains) in the report’s ‘wet scenario’ where costs are 
estimated to be higher than in the ‘dry scenario’. 
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buildings, railways, roads, and drainage. The World Bank’s 2010 report estimates urban 
infrastructure will make up just over half of all infrastructure costs and that these are likely to be 
highest in East Asia and the Pacific (p. xx).  
Trends in adaptation finance 
Finance committed to climate change adaptation makes up a very small proportion of 
total climate finance spending. Buchner et al. (2019) estimate that finance for adaption made 
up just 5% of total climate finance flows in 2017/2018 and a further 2.1% was estimated to be of 
‘dual benefit’ for both adaptation and mitigation. The vast majority of climate finance (93%) has 
been allocated to climate mitigation. Buchner et al. (2019) also note that the proportion of climate 
finance dedicated to adaptation has not changed from 2015/2016, but that ‘dual benefit’ flows 
have increased from 1.2% over the two-year period.  
“Adaptation finance gained momentum in 2017/2018, increasing 35% to an annual average 
of USD 30 billion from USD 22 billion in 2015/2016” (Buchner et al, 2019, p.21). While this 
recent increase is indicative of a positive shift in adaptation finance, the current value of 
investments remains far short of estimated adaptation costs and existing finance commitments 
(UNEP, 2018). As with total costs, estimates of tracked spending on climate adaptation vary 
widely due to the same definitional constraints noted above. Distinguishing spending on adaption 
from spending on mitigation and broader development programming present further definitional 
challenges (Buchner et al., 2019, p.21). 
Most climate finance remains in the country of origin (figure 1). Buchner et al. (2019) identify 
a “domestic preference” for investments, with 76% of tracked climate finance being invested in 
the country in which the finance is sourced. They also show that climate finance is balanced 
between investments in OECD and non-OECD countries. While the authors conclude that this 
indicates a “balanced awareness between developed and developing countries regarding the 
need to scale up climate investments”, it is important to note that the impacts of climate change 
are expected to be greater in LICs and MICs (see figure 2). 
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Figure 1: Climate Finance flows by OECD status of source and destination (USD, 2017/2018 
average) 
 
Source: Buchner et al (2019, p 24), licensed under Creative Common License, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/2019-Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance.pdf 
 
See: Figure 2: Predicted climate variability by GDP per capita and geographic region, Economist 
(2018), referring to data from Bathiany, Dakos, Scheffer & Lention (2018), 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/05/09/climate-change-will-affect-developing-
countries-more-than-rich-ones 
 
Nearly all investment in adaptation comes from public spending and the majority (79%) 
comes from national development finance institutions (Buchner et al., 2019, p.21). Figure 3 
shows a breakdown of tracked climate finance by type of public institution. Public finance for 
adaptation has been concentrated in a small number of sectors, with the water sector making up 
the largest share of investments (Buchner et al, 2019). Latest estimates show a balancing out of 
investment across sectors however, with 32% spent on water and wastewater management, 
24% on agriculture and land use, and 22% spent on disaster risk management (Buchner et al., 
2019, p.22). Increases in investments have been particularly strong for adaptation in the 
agricultural, forestry and land use sector (Buchner et al., 2019). 
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Figure 3: Public source and intermediaries of climate finance (USD billion) 
 
Source: Buchner et al. (2019, p.11), licensed under Creative Common License, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/2019-Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance.pdf 
 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), bilateral development finance and multilateral 
development finance are leading sources of international investment in adaption in LICs 
and MICs (Buchner et al., 2019; UNEP, 2016). While two thirds of ODA has been in the form of 
grants, the majority of international finance through bilateral and multilateral development finance 
institutions has been through low-cost or market-rate loans (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Adaptation finance sources and instruments 
Sources Main instrument (share of total) 
Official Development Assistance Grants (66%) and loans (32%) 
Bilateral development finance institutions Low-cost loans (80%) 
Multilateral development finance institutions Market-rate loans (84%) 
Source: UNEP (2016, p. 25), https://unepdtu.org/publications/the-adaptation-finance-gap-report/  
Private investors, which many argue are critical to meeting the costs of climate 
adaptation, make up a small proportion of tracked adaptation spending (Buchner et al., 
2019). Private investors may include: corporations, households, commercial financial institutions 
(i.e. providers of private debt capital), institutional investors (i.e. insurance companies, asset 
management firms, pension funds, foundations, endowments), private equity, venture capital and 
infrastructure funds (Climate Policy Initiative, 2019). The same challenges for estimation 
discussed above apply with the added challenge that many private investors do so in response to 
immediate threats rather than explicitly linking investments to adaptation (UNEP, 2016). Section 
4 explores some of the challenges in leveraging private finance for adaptation. 
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3. Overview of human and economic costs of failing to 
invest in climate adaptation 
The following section explores a set of human and economic costs related to climate change that 
are highlighted in the literature as critical areas for investment in climate adaptation: poverty and 
livelihoods, food security, and health. This does not represent a comprehensive list of potential 
human and economic costs but is rather intended to provide a short introduction to some of the 
leading issues being confronted in MICs that will require investment for the purpose of climate 
adaptation. References to priority countries for the UK Cross-Government Prosperity Fund2 are 
presented where possible. 
Poverty and livelihoods 
“Climate-related shocks and stresses, already a major obstacle to poverty reduction, will 
worsen with climate change” (IPCC, 2018, p.6). Examples of climate shocks and stresses that 
have had measurable impacts on poverty in MICs include:  
• Excessive rainfall and monsoons in Thailand in 2011 led to severe livelihoods losses, 
particularly for the urban poor, tree crop farmers and agricultural labourers (World Bank, 
2012). 
• Disproportionate impacts on poor residents of recent water shortages in Cape Town, 
South Africa and Chennai, India that nearly led to ‘Day Zero’ (no municipal water access) 
(Trivedi & Chertock, 2019).  
• Increased flooding in Bago city, Myanmar, has been shown to have a two-way 
relationship with poverty: poor people tend to live in flood-prone areas and flooding is 
found to exacerbate poverty (Kawasaki et al., 2020). 
MICs are projected to be some of the most affected by climate variability while also 
maintaining high rates of poverty, which climate change is expected to exacerbate. A 
study by Shepherd et al. (2013) explores countries’ combined vulnerability to future climate 
extremes such as droughts, extreme heat and floods and future vulnerability to poverty. MICs, 
including India, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Colombia, Thailand, Guatemala and Bangladesh, 
make up the majority of countries found to be in the ‘high vulnerability’ category based on their 
global assessment of combined future climate and poverty vulnerability (see figure 4). 
 
2 “The Prosperity Fund aims to support the inclusive economic growth needed to reduce poverty in partner 
countries. Through its primary purpose, the Fund’s activities will contribute to achieving the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals”. (GOV.UK, 2015).   
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Figure 4: Projected poverty levels in 2030 in countries with the highest exposure to droughts, extreme heat and 
floods
 
Source: Shepherd et al. (2013, p. ix), licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial Licence (CC BY-NC 
3.0), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8633.pdf  
The impacts of climate change are likely to be disproportionately felt by groups that 
already experience marginalisation, further exacerbating poverty among these groups. 
“People who are socially, economically, culturally, politically, institutionally, or otherwise 
marginalized are especially vulnerable to climate change and also to some adaptation and 
mitigation responses (IPCC, 2018, p.6). 
Food security 
A review of studies quantifying the impacts of climate change on food security found that 
undernourishment is predicted to rise by 5-26% in 2080, or between 5-10 million and 120-
170 million people, as a result of climate change (Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007). Most 
models predict sub-Saharan Africa will account for a larger share of global food insecurity (up to 
50%), though the authors note that this is only partly due to climate change, and more so the 
result of related social and economic development (Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007). One study 
by the FAO, modelling the impacts of climate change on crop yields with and without adaptation, 
found that some MICs could see significant yield losses if adaption is not achieved. The study 
found that crop yields could decrease by 38%-51% in Brazil, 28%-54% in Egypt, 38%-56% in 
India without adaptation measures (Fischer et al., 1996).  
Climate change has already negatively impacted food security in many regions due to 
increasing temperatures, changing precipitation patterns and greater frequency of 
extreme events, particularly in Africa, Asia and South America (IPCC, 2019, p.439).  These 
impacts are expected to worsen, with unpredictable crop production expected to affect rural 
households dependent on agriculture and increasing urban households’ vulnerability to food 
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price shocks. (IPCC, 2019; Benzie & John, 2015). The World Bank (2010) study on estimated 
costs for adaptation found that LICs and MICs are predicted to have the largest negative impact 
on crop production, particularly South Asia, and that changing trade patterns as a result of 
climate change are expected to have a compounding effect on food security. Recent impacts of 
climate change on food security in MICs include: 
▪ Prolonged drought in the Horn of Africa is currently threatening the food security of 
around 12 million people (ACAPS, 2019).  
▪ The 2009 typhoon in the Philippines affected over 9.3 million people and is estimated to 
have led to USD 3.2 billion in losses and damages to the agricultural sector (Shepherd et 
al., 2013).  
▪ Poor households that spend a high proportion of their income on food were highly 
impacted by the food price shock of 2007-2009 to which climate change was a 
contributing factor. The countries most impacted included poor net food importing 
countries as well as the urban poor in MICs (Compton et al., 2009). 
Health 
Climate change is predicted to cause an additional 250,000 deaths per year between 2030 
and 2050 due to malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress (WHO, 2018). “The direct 
damage costs to health (i.e. excluding costs in health-determining sectors such as agriculture 
and water and sanitation), is estimated to be between USD 2-4 billion per year by 2030” (WHO, 
2018). Adaptation costs are predicted to be highest in countries with weak health infrastructure, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa which is estimated to account for 80% of health sector 
adaptation costs by 2050 (World Bank, 2010, p.xii).  
The impacts of climate change on health, both historical and projected, is one of the more 
advanced areas of research based on the scoping conducted for this report. Health 
implications from climate change in middle income countries include: 
• A study on the health effects of climate change on children in Mexico found that diseases 
linked to climate change (diarrhoea and lower respiratory infections) are the leading 
cause of mortality among children aged 5-14 years old (Riojas-Rodríguez et al., 2018).  
• An analysis of national mortality and temperature data in South Africa over 17 years 
found that temperature-related mortality (from cold or hot spells) accounts for 3.4% of 
deaths in in the country. (Chersich et al., 2018).  
▪ An excess of 25,800-37,800 heat-related deaths per year have been predicted in 
Chinese cities between 2014-2060 (Chan et al., 2019). 
4. Strategies to fill the adaptation funding gap 
There are a range of direct financing and complimentary programming strategies that 
have been recommended in the literature to fill the climate adaptation financing gap, but 
the empirical evidence base to support these recommendations is very limited. The World 
Resource Institute (n.d.) notes that most adaption finance research is concerned with tracking 
flows to specific projects to monitor efforts to meet global adaptation funding targets, leaving 
research on adaptation financing modalities largely unexamined. This final section briefly 
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explores some cross-cutting themes that are discussed in the climate adaptation finance 
literature that speak to broad strategies to fill the adaptation funding gap: finance+ complimentary 
programming, leveraging private finance and decentralised spending for local impact.  
Finance+ complimentary programming 
The UNFCC (2007) include a useful list of complementary finance and programming strategies 
for donors to consider when assisting LICs and MICs to leverage additional finance and capacity 
to adapt to climate change: 
• Research: funding domestic government research organisations, international research 
organisations, universities, or research-oriented NGOs to improve adaptation strategies; 
• Extension and training: funding for rural training and extension programmes to 
disseminate adaptation options; 
• Transitional assistance: identifying resources for creating job opportunities, supporting 
incomes, developing new infrastructure/institutions, relocating industry, providing 
temporary food aid, improving market functions and developing insurance; 
• Trade policy: Governments may need to revise trade policies to adapt to new climate 
change conditions to allow imports and exports to mitigate lost production or to sell or 
dispose of surpluses; 
• Infrastructure development: support public investment in new transport and municipal 
infrastructure, development of new lands, protection or improvements of existing lands, 
construction of irrigation and water control structures, protection of coastal resources, 
and incubation of new industries. 
Leveraging private finance 
It is estimated that there are around USD 23 trillion in opportunities for ‘climate smart’ 
investments in emerging markets up to 2030, however private investment in adaption has 
so far been minimal (Buchner et al., 2019; Ellis & Pillay, 2018) Ellie & Pillay (2018) argue that 
private financial interests and the nature of climate projects do not currently align: 
“The fundamental challenge is that the private sector is more likely to invest in mitigation 
than adaptation projects, as these typically have short-term quantifiable benefits attached 
to them. This is a big issue for unlocking private climate finance for much needed 
adaptation interventions in many developing countries, as the lack of simple revenue 
streams, and therefore returns, make these investments riskier.” 
(Ellis & Pillay, 2018, p.4) 
Widely cited barriers to private investment that need to be addressed include “poor legal, 
economic and regulatory frameworks, immature financial markets, and currency exchange risks, 
… the cost saving nature of adaptation investment, which contrasts with the revenue-creation of 
the private sector, or other social and cultural barriers.” (UNEP, 2016, p.xiv). 
While it is often suggested that private finance is needed to fill the adaptation funding 
gap, some emphasise the critical role of the public sector in managing climate adaptation 
to ensure inclusive and effective strategies are adopted. Buchner et al. (2019, p.6) suggest 
that: 
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“governments have the unique opportunity to drive ambition and increase climate finance 
by explicitly adjusting the mandates of national institutions and of development banks… 
Public financial institutions must focus on the effectiveness and impact of climate 
investments in order to maximize value per dollar and ensure that public finance is used 
as a lever for transformative change.”  
UNEP (2016, p.xii) also argue that: 
“dedicated climate funds help break down barriers to investment in adaptation projects in 
developing countries … by strengthening the capacities of local stakeholders, creating 
incentives for institutions and investors (for example, by offering concessional terms) 
and, ultimately, by taking on risks from which commercial financiers will typically shy 
away”. 
Decentralised spending for local impact 
The majority of adaptation finance is directed towards national-level initiatives. However, 
there is emerging evidence that decentralised finance can provide good value for money 
(Chan & Amerasinghe, n.d.; Manuamorn et al., 2020; Soanes et al., 2017). Soanes et al., (2017) 
estimate that only 10% of climate finance was directed to local projects between 2003 and 2016. 
They note that in contrast to overall climate finance trends, around half of these local projects 
were aimed at adaptation and half towards mitigation.  
The participation of affected communities, particularly marginalised groups who will be 
disproportionately impacted by climate, is seen as an important factor for the 
effectiveness and sustainability of adaptation programmes (Soanes et al, 2017; UNEP, 
2016). Local institutions are often more receptive to local adaptation needs that are likely to be 
rapidly changing as climate change advances. Their proximity to communities can also facilitate 
transparency and accountability of adaptation investments (Soanes et al., 2017). 
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